Vor grossen Entscheidungen gilt es, das geplante Vorgehen nochmals sorgfältig zu prüfen und an der Realität zu spiegeln. Besonders, wenn es sich um eine “Weiterentwicklung” der Armee handelt, müssen längerfristige Entwicklungen darin abgebildet werden und Eingang in die Doktrin finden. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es hilfreich, die Ausführungen von Oberstlt i Gst Christoph Abegglen* aufmerksam zu lesen und sich seine eigenen Gedanken zu machen.
Warum keine Strategieformulierung aus der Verwaltung erwächst
Beatrice Heuser verortet Gründe, warum die Strategieformulierung des Staates in der Praxis nicht aus reiner, innerer Sachlogik getrieben ist, Studien aus der Verwaltung eher dem politischen Kalkül – also der Kunst des Möglichen – gehorchen und womöglich einzig den Kompromiss des kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenners abbilden, wie folgt:
“(…) Strategy [is] made, especially in peacetime, to further the interests of one’s state vis-à-vis others (allies included), government vs. opposition, one minister against another, one section of a ministry against another, the different branches of the armed forces among themselves, navy vs. army, paratroopers vs. marines, tank units vs. lightly armed infantry, and so on. In democracies, Strategy – often reflected in White Papers or Blue Books – [is] increasingly the product of committee work, with the agencies concerned represented, the final document being much less a work of logical coherence than of compromise, balancing the vested interests represented at the drafting table. Meanwhile, there [is] ever-fluctuating and evolving collective views on Strategy, sub-issues and related issues, often communicated by osmosis rather than reasoning, through ‘group think’ (…) engendered by frequent meetings in camera, by commonly read newspapers and the odd pertinent lecture remembered dimly from staff college or listened to in one of the think tanks. (…) strategic principles that [are] supposed to answer perceived and ever-evolving strategic problems are usually the final outcome of such committee work, usually supplemented by ‘late-night gossip’ in the Ministry of Defence, ‘and philosophizing over cheap sherry, with nearly all the ideas discarded next day but a nugget or two remaining. Nothing [is] ever written down; what [is] worthwhile [sticks] in the mind’ (…)
Add to this the proclivity of armed forces to fight wars not in ways that are most appropriate to reach the desired end state with regard to the adversary. Given any say in the matter, they prefer to fight the wars they have prepared for, for which they have acquired equipment, for which they have configured and which they want to play out in reality. Similarly, diplomats want to prove the usefulness of the treaty or the international organization they have promoted, so it must be the answer to the security problem of the day.”
Heuser, Beatrice (2010), The Evolution of Strategy – Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).